The potential for greenhouse gas (GHG) restrictions in some nations to increased emissions in other nations, or leakage, is a contentious issue in climate change negotiations. We evaluate the impact of border carbon adjustments (BCAs) outlined in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), using an economy-wide model. For 2025, we find that BCAs reduce leakage by up to two-thirds, but result in only modest reductions in global emissions and significantly reduce welfare. In contrast, BCA-equivalent leakage reductions can be achieved by very small emission charges or efficiency improvements in nations targeted by BCAs, which have negligible welfare effects. We conclude that BCAs are a costly method to reduce leakage, but may be an effective coercion strategy.
INTRODUCTION
There has been longstanding concern about the competitiveness and leakage effects when some countries implement emissions reduction policies while others do not. Leakage occurs when emissions in countries not covered by climate policy increase, as a result of emissions restrictions in other nations. Leakage can arise via two channels. First, emissions controls reduce global energy prices, causing substitution towards energy-intensive consumption in countries not covered by climate policy. Second, leakage occurs when production relocates from countries with emissions limits to countries without them. Early studies of the Kyoto Protocol examined the potential for leakage (see, for example, Bernstein et al., 1999) . Leakage reduces the effectiveness of climate policy and causes competitive concerns for domestic industries, fearing that imports of similar products that do not face higher energy prices due to climate policy will gain an advantage over domestically produced goods.
Leakage concerns are reflected in the bill passed by the US House of Representatives as the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), commonly known as the Waxman-Markey Bill (US Congress, 2009a) . Title IV, Subtitle A of H.R. 2454 seeks to "prevent an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in countries other than the US" (p. 1087) by requiring importers of certain products to purchase emission allowances, a measure analogous to a tariff. It is unclear whether border carbon adjustments (BCAs), or tariffs on embodied GHG emissions, are permissible under existing trade laws, but some authors argue that World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions for border tax adjustments (BTAs) provides scope for such charges.
The bill does not reference competiveness concerns but it appears that members of the House were mindful of such issues when designing the bill. In the discussion draft of the bill, Subtitle A of Title IV was labeled "Ensuring Domestic Competiveness" with the purpose "to compensate the owners and operators of entities in eligible domestic industrial sectors and subsectors for carbon emission costs" (US Congress, 2009b, p. 537) . It is also likely that competitiveness concerns will be important in Senate negotiations. Shortly after the bill passed the House vote, Michigan Senator Stabenow asserted that keeping BCAs in the legislation was her biggest concern. Similar sentiments were echoed by other senators from states with large manufacturing industries, including Ohio Senator Brown, "I don't think you can fully take care of manufacturing [and pass the bill] without some border equalization" (Hale, 2009) . Additionally, Democrat Senator John Kerry and Republican Senator Lindsey Graham voiced their support for climate change legislation in a New York Times Article, providing that BCAs are included (Kerry and Graham, 2009) 
. Senator Graham's view indicates that
Republican support for H.R.5425 in the Senate may hinge on the inclusion of BCA provisions.
Although H.R. 2454 was approved by the House of Representatives in June 2009, political arguments for BCAs are not new. Notably, forerunners to H.R. 2454 -the Bingaman-Specter (S. 1766) and Lieberman-Warner (S. 2191) bills -included instruments tantamount to tariffs on embodied GHG emissions. Elsewhere, French President Sarkozy stated that BCAs should be included in EU legislation, a proposal that has been criticized by the EU's Environmental Commissioner but is supported by a number of EU member states (ICTSD, 2009a) .
Opposing the view of the US and the EU, countries that do not plan nearterm GHG reductions, particularly India and China, have expressed concerns about GHG border measures. At informal climate talks in Bonn, Germany in August 2009, Indian officials drafted a resolution that developed countries shall not resort to any form of countervailing border measures against imports from developing countries (ICTSD, 2009b) . If BCAs eventuate, Columbia University Economist Jagdish Bhagwati claims that they will lead to massive, justified, WTO-legal retaliation by India and China (Hale, 2009 ). President Obama is wary of such concerns and has criticized the bill's provision for BCAs (Broder, 2009 ). Contrary to this opinion, WTO-UNEP (2009) concludes that carefully crafted BCAs may be permissible under existing trade laws.
Tariffs imposed by nations that restrict GHG emissions (the climate coalition) on imports from regions that do not control emissions (the noncoalition) have been evaluated by a series of computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies.
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Most CGE studies focus on the impact of BACs on leakage. Partial equilibrium studies focus on competiveness concerns.
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The general consensus in the literature is that BCAs are at best moderately successful at reducing leakage, but targeted border measures can be effective at addressing competiveness concerns. Mattoo et al. (2009) examine BCAs using the World Bank's Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium (Envisage) model. These authors focus on the impact of alternative embodied emissions calculations (e.g., estimates based on the carbon content of domestic goods versus calculations derived from the carbon content of foreign goods). Our analysis employs the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model and extends the BCA literature by considering leakage controls implemented by the non-coalition. Our results provide compelling evidence that BCAs are much more costly than non-coalition leakage measures and may be useful for policy discussions and international negotiations.
We find that BCAs can reduce leakage by up to two-thirds, but result in only modest reductions in global emissions and significantly reduce welfare. In contrast, BCA-equivalent leakage reductions can be achieved by very small emission charges or efficiency improvements in the non-coalition, which have negligible welfare effects.
Section 2 of this paper details provisions for BCAs in H.R. 2454 and discusses international trade rules surrounding these measures. Our modeling framework is detailed in Section 3 and results are discussed in Section 4. A sensitivity analysis is detailed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
BCA LEGISLATION
The International Reserve Allowance Program in H.R. 2454 requires importers of covered goods in "eligible industrial sectors" to purchase emission allowances related to the amount of GHG emissions embodied in imported products. Eligible industrial sectors are defined using three concepts: energy intensity, GHG intensity and trade intensity. Energy intensity in H.R. 2454 is calculated by dividing the cost of purchased electricity and fuel costs by the value of output. GHG intensity is determined by multiplying the number of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from fuel combustion, processing and electricity by 20, and dividing by the value of output. Trade intensity is defined as the sum of the value of imports and exports divided by the sum of the value of output and the value of imports.
A sector is eligible for the program if it has (i) an energy intensity or a GHG intensity greater than 5%, and a trade intensity greater than 15%, or (ii) an energy intensity or a GHG intensity greater than 20%. Several restrictions circumvent these rules. First, a sector is excluded if 85% or more of US imports in that sector are produced in countries that either have economy-wide GHG reduction programs at least as stringent as in the US, or have equal or lower energy or GHG intensities than the US. Second, imports sourced from nations responsible for less than 0.5% of global GHG emissions and accounting for less than 5% of US imports in the sector in question are exempt. Third, products from the least-developed nations and refined petroleum products are excluded.
H.R. 2454 requires that the price for international reserve allowances equals the clearing price from the most recent auction of allowances, but does not specify how the GHG content of imports will be calculated. Instead, the bill requires the administrator to establish "a general methodology for calculating the quantity of international reserve allowances that a US importer of any covered good must submit" (US Congress, 2009a , p. 1123 . The administrator must also adjust the number of international emission allowances per unit imported to account for the benefits to eligible industrial sectors from emission allowance rebates and the provision of free allowances to electricity.
One issue is whether trade provisions in H.R. 2454 are legal under WTO rules, which may depend on how they are classified relative to existing traderelated measures. The extra import charges called for by H.R. 2454 could be branded punitive tariffs, countervailing duties (imposed on the basis that unregulated GHG emissions in foreign countries are illegal subsidies) or BTAs (additional taxes on imports to offset differences in tax structures across countries). A number of studies examine whether BCAs are consistent with rules governing international trade set out by the WTO.
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The consensus in this literature is that punitive tariffs violate tariff concession rules specified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); countervailing duties violate both GATT rules and the WTO's Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement; but BTAs may be possible under WTO law. In this connection, a joint report by the WTO and the United Nations Environment Programme (WTO-UNEP, 2009, p. 89) notes that "the general approach under WTO rules has been to acknowledge that some degree of trade restriction may be necessary to achieve certain policy objectives, as long as a number of carefully crafted conditions are respected."
GATT Article II.2(a) details rules governing BTAs on imports, allowing countries to impose a charge equivalent to an internal tax on imports under certain conditions. Indirect taxes (taxes on products such as sales taxes) are eligible for adjustment but direct taxes (levies on producers such as payroll taxes) are not. Therefore, a key issue is whether taxes on inputs such as energy are direct or indirect taxes. Article II.2(a) also stipulates that BTAs on imports are only allowed (i) in respect to articles from which the imported product has been produced, and (ii) against taxes imposed on "like" domestic products (GATT, 1986, p. 4) . Some authors conclude that the wording of (i) restricts the use of BTAs to inputs physically incorporated in the final product, which would exclude emission charges. However, others argue that (ii) allows BTAs to be used to offset taxes on inputs used during the production process (i.e., applied indirectly on products), which provides scope for WTO-legal BTAs on GHG emissions.
Two historical cases are directly relevant for BCAs. First, in US-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (the Superfund case), a GATT dispute settlement panel allowed BTAs on chemicals contained in imported petroleum products. However, the panel did not specifically state that the substance had to be physically present in the final product (Neumayer, 2001) . Second, in the late 1980s, the US introduced a tax on ozone-depleting chemicals (ODCs) in order to implement the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The tariff was applied to both ODCs and products containing or produced using these chemicals, but the legality of such measures is uncertain as the tariffs were never challenged under WTO rules (Brack et al., 2000) .
GATT Article XX, which details general exceptions, provides another avenue to argue for BCAs. Two relevant exceptions include Article XX(b) and Article XX(g). Article XX(b) allows import restrictions that violate trade rules to be applied if they are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Article XX(g) relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 4 The process for determining the legality of GHG border measures is that, once implemented, countries "harmed" by the measures would need to lodge a complaint with the WTO, which would result in a ruling by the Dispute Settlement Body. In the absence of such a judgment, in remaining sections, we set aside legal issues and assume that BCAs are allowable under one or more of the above categories.
MODELING FRAMEWORK
We assess the economic and leakage impacts of BCAs using version 4 of the EPPA model. EPPA is described in detail by Paltsev et al. (2005) , and we outline the core features of the model below. EPPA is a multi-regional, CGE model of the global economy that links GHG emissions to economic activity. There is a single representative utility maximizing agent in each region that derives income from factor payments and emissions permits and allocates expenditure across goods and investment. The model uses a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure to describe preferences. The model is based on economic and energy data for 2001 and is solved for 2005 and every five years thereafter through to 2100, reflecting the model's focus on long-run policies. The model is recursive dynamic, so the model is solved one period at a time and behavior depends only on current and past states of the economy. As illustrated in Table 1 , EPPA recognizes Agriculture, five energy sectors (Coal, Crude oil, Refined oil, Gas and Electricity), two manufacturing sectors (Energy-intensive industry and Other industry), Transportation and Services. Each good is produced by perfectly competitive firms that assemble primary factors and intermediate inputs. All goods are traded internationally. Following Armington (1969) , goods are differentiated by region of origin and domestic goods are differentiated from (composite) imports using nested CES functions, except for Crude oil (which is a homogenous commodity). Alternative electricity generation technologies in EPPA enhance abatement options. Electricity can be produced using conventional technologies (e.g., electricity from coal and gas) and technologies not currently in use but which may become profitable as the emissions price rises (e.g., large scale wind generation and electricity from coal or gas with carbon capture and storage). As also indicated in Table 1 , primary inputs include three non-energy resources and seven energy resources. Capital and labor are free to move between sectors and land is specific to agriculture. Each energy resource is sector specific. Hydro, nuclear and wind & solar resources are specific to electricity generation technologies.
EPPA tracks the use of energy commodities (Coal, Refined oil and Gas) used in each sector measured in exajoules. These data combined with emissions per-exajoule coefficients for each energy commodity allow the model to predict carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. EPPA also traces non-CO 2 GHGs (e.g., methane, and nitrous oxide) measured in CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 -e) units using global warming potential (GWP) weights. GWP weights measure the ability of non-CO 2 gases to trap heat in the atmosphere relative to the heat-trapping capability of CO 2 over a 100 year period. When GHG emissions are restricted, the model calculates a shadow value associated with the emissions constraint, which is analogous to an emissions price that would develop under a cap-and-trade program. The model is calibrated using economic data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Dimaranan, 2006) and energy balance data from the International Energy Agency (IEA).
As H.R. 2454 targets narrowly-defined industries and our model identifies broad industry groups, we are unable to address competitiveness concerns in detail. 6 Also, the regional aggregation in the EPPA model does not allow us to consider some of the country-specific BCA exemptions in H.R. 2454. However, the global general equilibrium nature of the model and detailed treatment of energy systems means that our framework is well suited to assessing the impact of BCAs on leakage.
EMBODIED GHGS AND BCAS
As noted Section 2, H.R. 2454 does not set out how embodied GHG emissions will be calculated. Following Rutherford and Babiker (1997) , we use a comprehensive approach where total GHG emissions embodied in each commodity are the sum of direct and indirect emissions. Direct emissions are immediately linked with production, such as the combustion of fossil fuels to 6 In this connection, industries that use large amounts of energy per unit of output are most likely to meet the BCA provisions in H.R. 2454. These industries are included in Energy-intensive industry in the EPPA model and include the following GTAP sectors: paper products and publishing; chemical, rubber and plastic products; mineral products not included elsewhere (nonmetallic minerals); ferrous metals (iron and steel); metals not included elsewhere; and metal products. 7 We focus on the impact of BCAs that accurately target embodied GHG emissions and ignore monitoring costs. If monitoring costs are high, broad-brush trade measures may be preferred to targeted instruments (Engle, 2004). produce energy. Indirect emissions are associated with intermediate inputs. For example, total emissions from steel production equal emissions from the use of primary energy commodities (coal, refined oil and gas) in automobile manufacturing, plus emissions associated with the production of electricity and other intermediate inputs. Our calculations employ equation (1):
where X is an N×1 vector of total emissions per dollar for each of the N commodities; A is an N×N matrix, the ij th element of which is the number of dollars of good i used per dollar of good j being produced; and D is an N×1 vector of sectoral direct emissions coefficients per dollar of output.
Assuming that imported intermediate inputs embody the same quantities of GHG emissions as intermediate inputs sourced domestically, total embodied GHG emissions are computed by solving (1) for X:
BCAs are determined by embodied GHG emissions, calculated using equation (2), and carbon prices. For each applicable trade flow, we select an ad valorem tariff on imports of sector i from region s to r, τ i,s,r , so as to increase the price of imports from s by the additional costs incurred by region s producers if they faced the carbon price in r. That is, τ s is determined simultaneously with the carbon price so that:
where p i,s is the price of sector i in region s, pcarb r is the CO 2 -e price in region r, and x i , s is per-dollar emissions embodied in production of i in s. Embodied GHG calculations and BCA assignments are updated at the end of each modeling period. We do not adjust BCAs to account for the distribution of emissions allowances specified in H.R. 2454, as we assume that the granting of allowances to address competitiveness concerns will be phased out in favor of BCAs in the year we analyze (2025). Also, we do not consider border measures that provide relief for exporters.
BCA SCENARIOS
Yardsticks for BCA simulations are provided by business as usual (BAU) and cap-and-trade (CAT) scenarios, which we source a recent Energy Modeling Forum Climate Change Control Scenario, as described in Paltsev et al. (2009) . In BAU, population and labor productivity advance at predetermined rates and there are no GHG restrictions, but emissions grow at a slower rate than GDP due to autonomous energy efficiency improvements and depletion of natural resources. The CAT scenario used in our analysis gradually reduces US GHG emissions to 80% below 2000 emissions between 2015 and 2050, progressively reduces emissions in other Annex 1 regions, except the Former Soviet Union (FSU), to 50% below 1990 levels between 2010 and 2050, and restricts emissions in the FSU, China, India and Central and South America beginning in 2030. As it is unlikely that BCAs will be imposed after regions such as China and India begin to price emissions and EPPA has a five-year time step, we focus on the period prior to 2030. For ease of reference, we refer to Annex 1 regions that execute climate policies as the "coalition" of nations implementing climate policy. By 2025, relative to 2000, the US reduces emissions by 31% and other coalition regions curtail emissions by between 18% and 35%. These carbon constraints are more stringent than those in H.R. 2454, because there are no credits from outside the capped sectors in the Energy Modeling Forum scenario. For simplicity, we do not allow banking of allowances over time or trading of allowances across coalition nations.
9
Although H.R. 2454 proposes BCAs on imports from regions where GHGs are not taxed (with exemptions for some regions), we consider tariffs on imports from all non-coalition regions. This is because, as noted above, many non-coalition regions are included in composite regions in EPPA. This simplifying assumption is unlikely to influence our main conclusions, as exemption provisions target countries that account for a small proportion of global trade. However, welfare estimates for some countries may be imprecise.
Also, as economy-wide models typically analyze aggregated sectors, no EPPA sector meets the eligibility criteria for BCAs set out in H.R. 2454. However, BCA provisions are clearly aimed at production within Energyintensive industry, so we consider BCAs for this sector. To gauge the impact of the sectoral selectivity of BCAs in H.R. 2454, we also simulate tariffs on imports from non-coalition nations for all sectors.
Leakage and competitive concerns also exist elsewhere, so in other simulations we consider BCAs imposed by all coalition regions, both on all sectors and manufacturing independently. In summary, we analyze four BCA scenarios where, in addition to emission restrictions outlined in the CAT scenario, tariffs are imposed on imports from non-coalition regions: US tariffs on Energyintensive industry (US-EINT), coalition tariffs on Energy-intensive industry (CLT-EINT), US tariffs on all sectors (US-ALL), and coalition tariffs on all sectors (CLT-ALL).
Leakage can also be reduced by action in non-coalition regions, such as cap-and-trade programs and energy efficiency mandates. Here, one might view the threat of BCAs as a way for the climate coalition to coerce other nations to restrict GHG emissions. To investigate this alternative, instead of BCAs, we impose cap-and-trade programs in non-coalition regions in addition to coalition carbon restrictions in the CAT scenario. The emissions cap for each non-coalition region in this scenario is set at emissions observed in the CLT-ALL scenario. We label this scenario EQV.
MODELING RESULTS
We focus on results for 2025 as BCAs are largest in this year. To understand what is driving our results, Table 2 presents embodied GHG emissions by sector and region in 2025 calculated using equation (2). Emissions are reported in millions of metric tons (Mt) of CO 2 -e per US billion dollars of output. Electricity produces significantly more GHG emissions per dollar of output than other sectors in all regions. Electricity GHG emissions per dollar are highest in China, where 31.8 Mt CO 2 -e are released per billion dollars of output. Emissions per dollar are also relatively high in Agriculture and Energy-intensive industry. The numbers in Table 2 do not distinguish between gases, but unreported calculations reveal that Agriculture emissions are largely non-CO 2 gases while emissions from Energyintensive industry are predominantly CO 2 . Embodied emissions are also relatively high in Other industry, especially in non-coalition regions.
Comparing carbon emissions across countries, production in China, India, Africa and the FSU is relatively GHG intensive and, in general, emissions per dollar are higher in non-coalition regions than in coalition regions. These numbers reflect high use of coal as an energy source and low energy efficiency in the noncoalition, relative to in the coalition. However, care should be taken when making cross-country comparisons as the commodity composition of sectors may vary across regions and the number of physical units included in billion dollar bundles depends on the purchasing power of the US dollar relative to local currencies. Regarding commodity composition, shares of iron and steel and non-metallic minerals in Energy-intensive industry in China are more than double the corresponding shares in the US. As production of these commodities is more GHG-intensive than the production of other Energy-intensive commodities, differences in sectoral composition provide a partial explanation for differences in Energy-intensive industry GHG intensity across the US and China. Nevertheless, emissions per dollar coefficients in Table 2 are appropriate for calculating BCAs for aggregate sectors. For example, if Agriculture production in a region is concentrated in GHG intensive commodities, exports from this region will produce more emissions than exports from a region that specializes in agriculture commodities that are less GHG intensive. Additionally, other factors constant, if a billion dollars buys twice as many units in region A as region B, one billion dollars of imports from A will embody twice the amount of emissions as imports from B.
WELFARE AND CO 2 -E PRICES
For each policy, we calculate annual equivalent variation income changes to measure welfare impacts without considering climate benefits. Annual equivalent variation income changes are used to measure welfare changes. Proportional welfare changes relative to BAU for each EPPA region are reported in the appendix (Table A1 ). To focus on key regions, welfare changes for the US, the coalition (both including and excluding the US), the non-coalition and the world are reported in Table 3. 10 Table 3 . Changes in welfare and the price of crude oil relative to BAU (%), and the US CO 2 -e price ($/t), 2025
CLT-EINT

US-ALL
CLT-ALL EQV In the CAT scenario, US welfare falls by 1.16% and aggregate coalition welfare declines by 0.92%. Non-coalition welfare declines by 0.23%, although welfare increases in some non-coalition regions (see Table A1 ). The largest gainers from coalition climate policies are intensive exporters of manufacturing products that do not have to pay for GHG emissions, such as China, India and Higher Income East Asia. On the other hand, welfare for the Middle East falls by 2.79% due to the decrease in the price of Crude oil, which is also reported in Table 3 . In aggregate, global welfare falls by 0.70%. Although results are expressed relative to BAU for all scenarios (unless otherwise stated), welfare changes for remaining simulations are discussed relative to the CAT scenario. Table 3 also reports the US CO 2 -e price, which is around $86 per metric ton (t) in all scenarios.
BCAs influence welfare in three ways. First, as is well known, tariffs induce high-cost domestic production and increase consumer prices. Second, tariffs improve market access for coalition exporters at the expense of noncoalition firms. Third, tariffs generate terms-of-trade effects, which are considerable when commodities are differentiated by country of origin (Brown, 1987) . In the US-EINT simulation, US welfare decreases due to increased import costs. BCAs also induce a substitution in US purchases towards goods shipped from coalition regions, resulting in a welfare improvement in the coalition and a welfare loss in the non-coalition. Welfare losses are largest in Mexico and China (see Table A1 ).
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Both of these nations export large quantities of Energy intensive industry to the US. There is also a decrease in welfare in the Middle East, which is driven by a further decline in the price of Crude oil.
In our CLT-EINT scenario, US exports to coalition markets are favored relative to goods from the non-coalition, so US welfare increases relative to the US-EINT scenario (from -1.20% to -1.18%). Conversely, non-coalition welfare decreases relative to US-EINT, as tariffs are imposed on a higher proportion of Energy-intensive exports from this region. There is also a further decline in global welfare.
When the US imposes tariffs on all products, US-ALL, there are additional import costs for the US, so the welfare loss in this region is greater than for the US-EINT scenario. There is also a large decline in aggregate non-coalition welfare. Notable welfare losses are observed for China, India, Higher Income East Asia and the Middle East. In the CLT-ALL scenario, market-access and terms-oftrade gains outweigh losses due to increased import costs in the coalition, so welfare for the coalition increases (from -0.92% in the CAT scenario to -0.79%). Welfare in the non-coalition falls (from -0.23% in the CAT scenario to -1.41%) and, as in US-ALL, the largest losers are Mexico, Higher Income East Asia, China and the Middle East. It is also interesting to compare welfare changes for the CLT-ALL and US-ALL scenarios. First, US welfare improves when the coalition imposes tariffs, relative to when only the US sets BCAs, due to marketaccess effects. Second, the numbers reveal that nearly all of the welfare decrease for Mexico and about two-thirds of the welfare decrease for China is brought about by US BCAs. 11 As we unable to model some of the country exemption provisions in H.R. 2454, welfare results for some non-coalition regions should be interpreted with caution. Welfare for many African countries may increase as a result of BCAs due to exclusion provisions for least developed nations. Additionally, non-coalition nations with GHG intensities lower than the US may gain from BCAs. For these reasons, our estimates are likely to overestimate the impact of BCAs on some non-coalition regions.
When leakage reductions in each country in the CLT-ALL scenario are brought about by cap-and-trade policies in the non-coalition, EQV, welfare changes in all regions are very similar to those in the CAT scenario. That is, BCA-equivalent leakage reductions can be achieved at essentially no cost. Noncoalition CO 2 -e prices (not reported in Table 3 ) are less than $0.01/t (except in Mexico, where the CO 2 -e price is $0.29/t).
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In an additional scenario (not reported in Table 3 ), we eliminate leakage using non-coalition cap-and trade policies. CO 2 -e prices are less than $0.01/t in all non-coalition regions except in Mexico ($0.48) and the FSU ($0.02) under this constraint. Welfare changes in this scenario are also similar to those in the CAT scenario. These results indicate that tariffs are a much more costly leakage reduction method than direct controls.
It is unlikely that near-term cap-and-trade policies in the non-coalition are feasible, either because the non-coalition refuses to bind emissions and/or because tiny carbon prices render such systems impractical. Consequently, efficiency improvements may be a more feasible way to reduce emissions. A back-of-theenvelope calculation indicates that, assuming replacing a standard light bulb with a compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulb saves 100 kilograms of CO 2 emissions per year, Chinese leakage could be offset by about one in ten of China's 360 million households installing a single CFL bulb.
BCAs have little impact on US CO 2 -e prices. This is because increases in Energy-intensive industry production are accompanied by reduced Transportation output. As a result, there is little change in aggregate demand for emissions permits. CO 2 -e prices in other coalition regions follow a similar pattern. On the other hand, BCAs induce large changes in the price of Crude oil, driven by decreasing Transportation output in the coalition and decreased energy demand elsewhere.
OUTPUT
Output changes relative to BAU are presented in Tables 4a-4c. In the CAT scenario, the largest output reductions are observed for Coal, Refined Oil and Gas in the coalition.
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Energy-intensive industry production falls by 3.6% in the US and 2.2% in the coalition, and increase by 1.5% in the non-coalition.
12 Small non-coalition carbon prices reflect low initial emissions reduction costs in this region. As shown by Carbone et al. (2009) , cheap abatement opportunities in developing countries provide scope for international trade in emission permits even in the absence of a global cooperative agreement. 13 Oil production falls by less than production in other energy sectors, as oil is a homogeneous good in our model. Consequently, the domestic price and ultimately output are less responsive to domestic policies than in other sectors.
In our BCA scenarios, producers respond to changes in tariff-inclusive import prices. Tariffs imposed by the US in US-ALL are reported in Table A2. 14 In addition to displaying US tariffs on imports from each non-coalition region, the table presents value-weighted US tariffs on imports from the non-coalition group and on imports from all regions (where BCAs on imports from coalition regions are zero). The all-region value-weighted Energy-intensive tariff is only 4.4%, as 62% of US imports of this commodity are sourced from other coalition regions (and do not attract BCAs). In contrast, the share of commodities sourced from the non-coalition in US imports of Agriculture and Other industry and Services is 84% and 60%. As a result, Agriculture attracts the largest value-weighted tariff (19.7%) and valueweighted tariffs for Other industry, Services and Transportation are higher than that for Energy-intensive industry. Consequently, relative to the CAT scenario, US Energy-intensive output falls and Agriculture production expands in the US-ALL scenario. 15 These results indicate that US BCAs can result in unexpected output changes. However, the high level of sectoral aggregation in our model means that this result should be interpreted with caution. Examining trade data for GTAP commodities included in Energy-intensive industry reveals that more than 14 As tariffs for other scenarios depend on sectoral GHG emissions and coalition carbon prices, which are similar across simulations, we do not report carbon tariffs for other scenarios. 15 In this scenario, as expected, unreported calculations show that domestic consumption of US Energy-intensive industry increases (by 1.4%). However, as US exporters face greater competition from non-coalition producers and increased production costs, US Energy-intensive exports fall by 11.1%. 50% of US imports of iron and steel and non-metallic minerals are sourced from the non-coalition. Therefore, it is likely that US BCAs would increase domestic production of these commodities. In our CLT-ALL scenario, there is a small increase in US Energy-intensive production as coalition regions substitute away from non-coalition varieties.
When BCAs are only imposed on Energy-intensive industry, relative to the CAT scenario, Agriculture output decreases and Energy-intensive industry expands. The increase in US Energy-intensive output is largest in the CLT-EINT scenario. However, even in this scenario, Energy-intensive output falls by 1.4% relative to BAU. Turning to the impact of BCAs on other regions, in the rest of the coalition, Agriculture expands the most when tariffs are applied to all sectors and, in the two EINT scenarios, Energy-intensive production increases by the largest proportion. In the non-coalition, in both the US-ALL and CLT-ALL scenarios, the largest proportional decline is for Agriculture, which faces high tariffs. In the two EINT scenarios, there are large reductions in Energy-intensive and Other manufacturing production. As for welfare, output changes in the EQV scenario are similar to those in the CAT scenario.
LEAKAGE
GHG emissions and the leakage rate, calculated as the increase in non-coalition emissions divided by the decrease in coalition emissions, relative to BAU, are reported in Table 5 . The leakage rate is 10.1% in the CAT scenario, indicating that non-coalition CO 2 -e emissions increase by about 10 Mt for every 100 Mt abated in the coalition. The leakage rate is 7.1%, about one-third lower, when the US imposes BCAs on all sectors. In the US-EINT and CLT-EINT scenarios, leakage is 7.9% and 5.8% respectively. The lowest leakage rate (3.8%) is observed in the CLT-ALL scenario and is around 60% lower than in the CAT scenario. Although this BCA-induced leakage reduction is larger than estimated in most other studies, it is not unexpected given the CLT-ALL tariff shock. Comparing results across EINT and ALL scenarios indicates that around 70% of tariff-induced leakage reductions result from tariffs on Energy-intensive products. The leakage calculations also suggest that around one-half of the leakage reduction brought about by BCAs is due to US border measures. Although BCAs reduce leakage by up to 60%, the numbers mask small changes in global emissions. As displayed in Table 5 , in 2025, the non-coalition's contribution to global emissions is 70% in BAU and 78% in the CAT scenario, so leakage calculations are sensitive to small proportional changes in non-coalition emissions. As a result, the 60% leakage reduction in CLT-ALL -the largest tariff-induced leakage reduction -corresponds to a 0.8% fall in non-coalition emissions and only a 0.6% decrease in global emissions. When combined with the welfare changes reported in Table 3 , the leakage calculations indicate that the incremental reductions in emissions via BCAs are nearly six times as costly on average as the primary reductions from CAT programs. Specifically, in the CAT scenario among coalition countries, global emissions fall by 46.6 Mt and global welfare declines by 0.7%, resulting in a welfare reduction of 1.5% per 100 Mt of abatement. In the CLT-ALL scenario, emissions decrease by an additional 3.2 Mt and world welfare falls by a further 0.28%, so welfare decreases by 8.8% per 100 Mt of abatement.
As a further indication of the efficiency of direct controls relative to BCAs, we calculate the emissions reduction that can be achieved in China by a cap-and-trade policy that leaves China as well off as in the CLT-ALL scenario. The results (not reported in Table 5 ) indicate that China can reduce 2025 emissions by 35% relative to BAU under this constraint, which generates a 2025 CO 2 -e price of around $10/t. In comparison, Chinese emissions in the CLT-ALL scenario are approximately equal to BAU emissions.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Key parameters in our analysis include elasticities of substitution between imports from different sources, and elasticities of substitution between composite imports and domestic production. We refer to these elasticities collectively as "Armington elasticities". Hertel et al. (2007) estimate Armington elastcities for commodities in the GTAP database. Armington elasticities for EPPA commodities are loosely based on value-weighted averages of these estimates. For most commodities, the substitution elasticity for imports from different sources is 5, and the elasticity of substitution between composite imports and domestic production is 3. We examine the sensitivity of our results to these parameters by multiplying Armington elasticities by 0.5 and 2. We also report results when the Armington multiplier is 1, to facilitate comparison with our core results.
Proportional welfare changes for the CLT-ALL scenario relative to the CAT scenario in 2025 are displayed in Figure 1 . Welfare changes for other scenarios follow a similar pattern and are not reported. In nations imposing BCAs (the US and other coalition regions), welfare decreases as Armington elasticities increase. This is because larger Armington elasticities imply less product differentiation and ultimately smaller terms-of-trade improvements from BCAs. As terms-of-trade welfare changes sum to zero, non-coalition welfare increases as Armington elasticities increase, and the change in world welfare is similar across Armington specifications.
We also calculate welfare changes resulting from cap-and-trade programs in non-coalition regions that result in BCA-equivalent leakage reductions for alternative Armington multipliers. As in our core scenarios, non-coalition carbon prices are tiny and welfare changes are almost identical to those in the CAT scenario. That is, our central conclusion that leakage can be offset by very modest commitments by the non-coalition is robust t o alternative plausible Armington elasticities. 
CONCLUSIONS
We evaluated the potential for BCAs to reduce competitiveness concerns and leakage using an economy-wide model focusing on 2025. Although sectoral aggregation in our model did not allow us to evaluate competitiveness concerns in detail, we found that BCAs applied to all sectors will not necessarily increase Energy-intensive output. This is because, relative to other sectors, a high proportion of coalition Energy-intensive imports are sourced from other coalition regions and do not attract BCAs. Consequently, for the US, the Energy-intensive tariff, value-weighted across sources, is lower than value-weighted tariffs for some other sectors. However, BCAs applied to only Energy-intensive industry will increase domestic output of this sector. Although BCAs have small emissions impacts, they have pronounced welfare effects per unit of abatement. When the coalition imposed BCAs on all products, the change in coalition welfare improved from -0.75% in the CAT scenario to -0.53%, but the change in non-coalition welfare deteriorated from -0.23% to -1.41%. The net result was a worsening in world welfare from -0.70% in the CAT scenario to -0.98% (for an almost negligible reduction in global emissions). As an alternative to BCAs, we considered pricing non-coalition GHG emissions so that, in each region, emissions equaled those observed when BCAs are employed. CO 2 -e prices that achieve this objective were around $0.01 per ton in nearly all regions and had negligible welfare effects. Cap-and-trade programs with such small carbon prices may not be viable, so the adoption of modest energy efficiency improvements in the non-coalition may be a more practical solution.
Our findings suggest that non-coalition regions may wish to adopt emission controls as part of a global agreement, providing such measures prevent the coalition from adopting BCAs. In this connection, China has announced plans to reduce its 2020 GHG emissions to GDP ratio by 45% relative to 2005 through GHG efficiency improvements. An agreement binding China to this goal (or a slightly more ambitious target) may be a viable alternative to BCAs. However, as leakage reductions achieved by modest non-coalition controls will still leave coalition producers at a cost disadvantage relative to imports from the noncoalition, it remains to be seen whether coalition politicians will be willing to strike out BCAs. We conclude that BCAs are a costly method to reduce leakage, but may be an effective coercion device.
Regarding leakage, we found that BCAs reduce leakage by around 30% when imposed by the US and about 60% when levied by all coalition regions. As the non-coalition accounts for more than three-quarters of global emissions, these leakage changes mask small changes in global emissions. When leakage fell by 60%, non-coalition emissions fell by 0.8% and global emissions declined by only 0.6%. 
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